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EIPA’s research project1 on consistency in the EU’s external
relations takes as its departure point the call in the TEU for
‘consistency of its external activities as a whole in the
context of its external relations, security, economic and
development policies.’ The consistency refrain appears not
only overtly but also implicitly as in, for example, the
Union’s objective to assert ‘its identity on the international
scene.’
What does consistency mean? Consistency is considered
to be coordinated behaviour based on agreements amongst
the Union and its Members States, where comparable and
compatible methods are employed in pursuit of a single
objective which results in an uncontradictory policy.2
In accordance with the literature in the field, consistency
is considered in its vertical and horizontal manifestations:
vertical consistency considers relations between the Member
States and the Union, while horizontal consistency applies to
relations between the external relations apparatus of the
Union.
In the CFSP context, which is the subject of the first part
of the project, consistency has considerable practical
importance. The unsure and spasmodic EU reactions to a
variety of post-cold war security challenges (Bosnia, Albania
and Kosovo in particular) and reliance upon the U.S. for
leadership and military muscle, have illustrated CFSP’s
shortcomings in stark relief. An inconsistent response to
crisis situations will have no deterrent effect upon future
trouble-makers or abusers of human rights. The ability to
offer a seamless web of crisis responses, ranging from non-
military to military forms, will not only make the Union in
general a consistent actor but may well contribute to the
stability of the region. It is an interesting and perhaps
sobering realisation that in every single post-cold war
European crisis, ad hoc solutions and reliance upon ‘coalitions
of the willing’ has been the modus operandi.
Consistency is not considered to be a legal requirement
since its justiciability is, at best, weak. Perhaps this is the first
of many inconsistencies in the EU’s external relations,
where the responsible overseers are identified in the TEU
(the Council and the Commission) but there are no real
means of control or enforcement, especially in the second
pillar. However, even if there were adequate means within
the Union, inconsistency may still stem from the Member
States and the different national ministries therein. The
manner in which the Member States organise themselves
domestically (vertical consistency) is therefore an issue
which needs to be addressed in parallel with efforts to ensure
the consistency of the Union.3
Vertical consistency is notoriously difficult to ensure
since, in the foreign and security policy realm, the mechanisms
employed by the fifteen foreign ministries to ensure that ‘its’
voice is heard in Brussels varies enormously. Some are more
effective than others since they have highly organised and
centralised structures to ensure this while others, especially
those with coalitions or political forms of cohabitation, find
it much harder. The intergovermental nature of the EU’s
second pillar may also encourage the advancement of national
positions over the search for commonalities. Larger states
will also tend to forward their interests in different ways
from smaller states in the external relations realm as will
those with special positions, like the neutral and non-aligned
members. One obvious, but highly sensitive, way of
addressing some of the root causes of vertical inconsistency
is to stress greater training and co-ordination efforts at the
European level for diplomats and officials in the CFSP
realm. In this regard many of the European militaries (and,
to an extent, the defence industries) have realised the need
for Standard Operating Procedures (which is of essential
importance for a consistent response capacity) between
themselves. The economic and political pressures that bear
upon the militaries in post-cold war Europe have already
induced profound changes that may yet have a ‘trickle up’
effect on foreign policy planners.
Generally at the horizontal level progress has been
made, especially after the dismantling of most of the old
European Political Co-operation and Community parallel
structures in the Maastricht Treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty
introduced a number of potentially valuable mechanisms to
enhance CFSP consistency. For instance, the Policy Planning
and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), although modest, opens
up the possibility of more deliberative approaches to issues
rather than reactive and ad hoc reactions. The use of Qualified
Majority Voting in the second pillar may also help avoid
paralysis through the need for unanimity but any use of
armed force will require unanimity and, as Bosnia and
Kosovo showed, a strong external influence to provide the
requisite leadership and coherence.
Efforts to enhance both vertical and horizontal
consistency have continued during the last year which, at
least on paper, may prove to have be CFSP’s annum mirabilis
based on the apparent determination of the EU Member
States to give substance to vision. Accordingly, the Cologne
and Helsinki European Council proposed a number of new
permanent bodies for the second pillar. The introduction of
the interim Political and Security Committee (COPS), the
Military Committee and Military Staff, on 1 March 2000
holds the promise of improving consistency between CFSP
and the burgeoning Common European Security and Defence
Policy (CESDP) – also referred to at Cologne and Helsinki.
But, precisely how the new structures fit in with existing
ones, such as COREPER, remains to be seen. Although
Article 25 of the TEU suggests that treaty revision is not
necessary for the introduction of the interim (and later
permanent) bodies, there would seem to be compelling
political reasons to use the ongoing intergovernmental
discussions as a way of clarifying their mandates and relations
with other structures. Finally, the introduction of the second
common strategy, on the Ukraine, at the December 1999
Helsinki European Council represents a tremendously useful
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decision-making that covers all the pillars.
The new CFSP structures may also have implications for
consistency at the national level where the growing visibility
of defence ministries, alongside trade ministries, in European
affairs may challenge the traditional role of foreign ministries
as primus inter pares. It would be a misnomer to suggest that
the European Council’s initiatives will cause inconsistency
but they may nevertheless exacerbate the trend away from
foreign ministries as ‘gatekeepers’ of external relations in
the EU context thus posing new challenges to vertical
consistency.
Consistency has a further important aspect – how the
Union is seen by third parties. In this respect the Union has
perhaps unwittingly done itself a disservice with the
appointment of a High Representative for CFSP (especially
such a well known international diplomat). Javier Solana’s
appointment has raised the question of who embodies the
external persona of the Union. Is it Romano Prodi, Chris
Patten, Javier Solana or any number of other Commissioners
who can legitimately claim external interests? Prodi’s invite
and subsequent withdrawal of an invitation to Libya’s Colonel
Muammar Gadaffi underlined the point.
Consistency also extends to the EU’s relation with other
regional and international organisations. The partial merger
of the WEU into the EU carries with it the seeds of greater
predictability and consistency (with the notable exception of
defence). However the potential for inconsistency is also
apparent if the Member States fail to plan together to procure
and fund the necessary resources to make CESDP a reality.
This is a matter of immediate concern to not only the EU
fifteen but also the eighteen non-EU WEU associates or
observers and the four non-EU NATO members. The inter-
organisational aspects of security and defence may well pose
the biggest challenge to consistency in the second pillar.
The WEU, for all practical purposes, will soon disappear
which means that EU-NATO relations will become of prime
importance and, if conflict prevention continues to be stressed,
so too will EU relations with the Council of Europe and the
OSCE. In spite of the generally positive notes being sounded
in the aftermath of the joint NATO-WEU crisis management
exercise (CMX-CRISEX) in February 2000, it is worth
noting the exercise comprised two scenarios. One was a
‘NATO only’ collective defence exercise and the other was
a joint NATO-WEU crisis management exercise using NATO
assets. The scenarios perhaps unwittingly pointed at the
future path for European defence and security.
It is unlikely that the four neutral and non-aligned EU
members, to which Denmark should be added, will accept
the indirect or direct incorporation of a defence role into the
EU post WEU. This implies that consistency within the
CESDP may well be found through surrendering the defence
aspects found in, for example, Article 17 of the Treaty on
European Union. The ‘D’ in CESDP would therefore have
to be dropped and this role would fall explicitly to NATO. In
the EU context the emphasis would then be upon crisis
prevention and crisis management which will still necessitate
the kinds of military improvements identified by the Cologne
and Helisnki European Council summits, as well as the
WEU’s November 1999 Audit of Assets and Capabilities.
Following a Finnish-Swedish initiative, emphasis has
also been placed upon non-military crisis management.4 The
non-military crisis management goals outlined at Helsinki
may not be as attention grabbing as the ‘headline goals’ for
the development of the EU’s military crisis management
capability, but they pose considerable demands on
consistency. Not only does it necessitate consistency between
the pillars of the Union in issues as diverse as humanitarian
assistance, civilian policing, search and rescue and
administrative and legal rehabilitation, it also demands
considerable coordination with other international
organisations in the field, such as the OSCE and UN, as well
as a host of NGOs. The record in Bosnia and Kosovo
suggests that there is considerable room for improvement in
this regard.
Consistency also requires that attention be paid to the
aftermath of the WEU and, specifically, in what ways the
Associate Members (Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland,
Norway, Poland and Turkey) should be involved in EU
crisis management operations. The status of the WEU’s
current observers (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and
Sweden), all of whom are EU members, means that prior
agreement is necessary in the EU Council before non-EU
NATO members can be invited to participate. Since the
WEU was used to operating ‘at 21’ (the ten full members,
plus the six associate members and the five observers) and,
with increasing frequency ‘at 28’ (adding on the seven
associate partners), the question rises of whether Europe can
retreat back to fifteen. The importance of consistency between
the external relations pillars of the EU may well point in this
direction while, if the CMX-CRISEX sets an example, there
is a need to prepare for crisis management ‘at 30’ (the 28 plus
Canada and the United States).
The research, which is confined to the second pillar so
far, notes a number of improvements in consistency at the
vertical and horizontal levels. Notwithstanding a number of
significant developments, the highly intergovernmental
nature of the CFSP continues to give rise to concern about
the Union’s overall consistency as an actor on the international
scene. Above all, the Kosovo crisis showed how much there
is to be done to create a seamless web of appropriate and
applicable tools for post-cold war external relations. These
should range from conflict prevention to a variety of crisis
management tools ranging from diplomatic intercession, to
economic leverage, to the credible threat of armed force and,
in extremis, the use of armed force. The continued inability
to link these facets together in a predictable and coherent
manner will condemn the Union to consistently inconsistent
responses – otherwise known as ad hoccery. Further research
will examine consistency in other areas of the Union’s
external relations such as trade and development.
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